

Reconstructing the People's Consultative Assembly Through the Directive Principles for Pancasila Democracy Representation

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Abstract: The decline of public trust in representative institutions and the fragmentation of political parties indicate an acute crisis of representation in Indonesia's post-reform constitutional democracy. This article aims to formulate a discourse on reconstructing the authority of the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR) through the institutionalization of the Broad Outlines of State Policy (*Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* or GBHN) and the reintegration of Group Representation (*Utusan Golongan*) as a solution to developmental discontinuity and the alienation of functional aspirations. Utilizing normative legal research with a comparative approach to the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) models in India and Ireland, this study establishes a reconstruction typology with facilitative, deliberative, and directive dimensions. The novelty of this research lies in two fundamental aspects: first, the "Indonesianization of GBHN" with a non-justiciable character, accompanied by a proposed safeguard clause in Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution to protect the presidential system from the risks of abusive constitutionalism. Second, the formulation of a meritocratic multi-stage bottom-up selection mechanism for Group Representation to dismantle the dominance of political oligarchies. Philosophically, this constitutional engineering is not merely a romanticization of past authoritarianism, but a concrete articulation of Pancasila Deliberative Democracy that transforms the MPR into a "National House", an inclusive national deliberative forum that unites political, territorial, and functional mandates in determining the nation's future direction.

Keywords: Broad Outlines of State Policy; People's Consultative Assembly; Group Representation; Meritocracy; Pancasila Deliberative Democracy.

1. Introduction

Indonesia's constitutional democracy is currently facing a significant test alongside declining public trust in representative institutions. This phenomenon confirms Ulum's (2020) study on post-reform democratic regression, in which political parties have fragmented and failed to facilitate meaningful and constitutional citizen participation. Empirical evidence reveals a sharp disparity in trust; an Indonesian Survey Institute (*Lembaga Survei Indonesia* or LSI) survey noted that public trust in the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or DPR) is only 54%, far below the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI) at 88% and the President at 86% (Rosman, 2023). This imbalance indicates an acute crisis of representation rooted in the limitations of the current political representation model to absorb the aspirations of functional groups within society. The absence of Group Envoy representation post-reform is suspected of widening the gap between the formal structure of representative institutions and the actual socio-functional entities in society. The escalation of this public dissatisfaction is manifested in social unrest such as the September 2025 riots and the

Kevin Mahrus Ali, Desinta Dwi Rapita, Zulfikar Waliyuddin Fattah, Siti Noranizahhafizah Boyman "Reconstructing the People's Consultative Assembly Through the Directive Principles for Pancasila Democracy Representation" *Pancasila Jurnal Keindonesiaan*, Vol. 06, No.2 (2026)

Received: December 31, 2025; Revised: September 19, 2026; Accepted: September 28, 2026, Available online: October 23, 2026

emergence of the Tuntutan 17+8 (17+8 Demands) (Arga, 2025; Utama, 2025). These events serve as an alarm that the current constitutional design has failed to realize a prosperous socio-political order, prompting a fundamental evaluation of the People's Consultative Assembly's (MPR) role as the highest deliberative forum safeguarding the direction of the state's ideals. At a deeper level, this crisis reflects a deadlock in actualizing Pancasila values, particularly the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Precepts (*Sila*), in supporting the representation system. To resolve this deadlock, this article proposes a discourse on reconstructing the MPR's authority through a more flexible state policy model resembling Directive Principles, as a uniquely Indonesian constitutional solution that can revitalize the nation's direction without repeating the mistakes of past authoritarianism.

The realignment of relations between the MPR and the President post-reform has evidently failed to provide concrete developmental guidelines (Sorik & Aulia, 2020). This fundamental gap emerged with the abolition of the MPR's authority to establish state policy, which, according to Fadhil et al. (2025) is further exacerbated by political dynamics within Indonesia's system of power representation. This condition is validated by Humaidi and Rahmadanti (2023) who criticize the National Development Planning System (*Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional* or SPPN) as overly executive-centric, making the direction of national development highly dependent on the subjective vision of the president and prone to discontinuity. However, efforts to reconstruct this authority often encounter public suspicion regarding the resurgence of authoritarian traditions, as Satrio (2023) warns that the original text of the 1945 Constitution was built upon Soepomo's integralistic concept, which viewed the state as being without constitutional bounds—an authoritarian paradigm that must be prevented in future amendment discourses.

In this discourse, Pancasila is positioned as a Constitutional Paradigm that integrates philosophical values, basic norms, and directive principles as a single national consensus or "triangle of basic state consensus" (Ansori, 2019). Thus, the Fourth and Fifth Precepts serve as normative benchmarks to ensure that legal transformation remains consistent with the corridor of popular sovereignty to avoid a crisis of representation. This deliberative democracy framework is then contextualized with the urgency of sustainable national development (Bahri & Abustan, 2025) to correct the current planning model that tends to be executive-centric and subjective (Humaidi & Rahmadanti, 2023). Through this framework, the research proposes reconstructing the MPR's authority as an instrument to restore coherence in the state's direction without sacrificing prevailing modern constitutional principles.

This research is built upon the theoretical framework of deliberative democracy contextualized with Pancasila values through the approach of state philosophy (Ansori, 2019). This perspective aligns with the global trend of "deliberative waves," as reviewed by Martuli et al. (2024) which emphasizes the importance of redesigning supreme representative institutions to absorb aspirations missed by political parties' electoral mechanisms. To strengthen this structure, the concept of functional political representation is utilized to correct the crisis of the representative function of political parties (Winarti, 2019), formulated through the idea of reintegrating Group Representation, while also overcoming the stagnant dynamics of representation in Indonesia (Fadhil et al., 2025). Furthermore, to overcome the rigidity of the formal amendment of Article 37 of the 1945 Constitution, this research considers the living constitution approach (Fauzani et al., 2020) combined with the integration of MPR Decrees into directive principles (Affandi & Muthaqqin, 2023) as an alternative method of enforcing state policy through constitutional conventions without being trapped in the rigidity of constitutional amendment procedures.

Previous studies have mapped this discourse from various angles. Hapsoro et al. (2024) analyzed the shift in the MPR's authority after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution and found that this weakening has reduced the MPR's role in the Annual Session to a ceremonial forum without strategic bargaining power. Regarding the loss of the state-guiding function, Yuhana (2024) concluded that abolishing the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) has tangibly created discontinuity in the direction of national development, which always changes with every presidential transition. Meanwhile, from the perspective of legal politics, Fudika & Chaidir (2021) affirmed the urgency of reviving state policy through MPR Decrees, noting that the current planning law model, namely the National Long-Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional or RPJPN), is highly vulnerable to political compromises driven by group interests. On the other hand, Omara (2025) issued a critical warning regarding the danger of abusive constitutionalism if constitutional amendments, including the discourse on the Principal Outlines of State Policy (*Pokok-Pokok Haluan Negara* or PPHN), are abused solely to accumulate power for state institutions without strengthening democracy.

Although linguistically, the MPR RI Assessment Body (2021) tends to use the nomenclature Principal Outlines of State Policy (PPHN) to avoid past stigmas, this research consciously maintains the historical nomenclature of GBHN. The use of the term GBHN in this manuscript is not intended to restore the MPR's supremacy in the pre-reform era, but to conceptually reconstruct it as an instrument with the character of directive principles adapted to the presidential system. Regardless of this choice of nomenclature, previous studies have not substantially examined the integration aspects between contemporary social legitimacy crises, such as the manifestation of the Tuntutan 17+8 and the institutional engineering of non-justiciable state policies. This article fills that gap by offering a typology for reconstructing the MPR's authority with facilitative, deliberative, and directive dimensions, adapted from the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) model. Furthermore, this research proposes a multi-stage, bottom-up selection mechanism for Group Representation and a draft amendment to the 1945 Constitution specifically designed to prevent abusive constitutionalism. These efforts are aimed at strengthening Pancasila deliberative democracy that is responsive to the dynamics of the times.

2. Method

This research is normative legal research of a descriptive-analytical nature (Soekanto, 2006). The approaches utilized include the statute approach, conceptual approach, and historical approach. Additionally, this article applies a limited comparative constitutional law method to compare the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) models in India and Ireland with the concept of state policy to be established. The comparison focuses on the norm's non-justiciable nature, its position in the hierarchy of statutory regulations, and how its logical consequences are modified to remain aligned with Indonesia's presidential system. Secondary data collection was conducted through library research, encompassing primary legal materials such as the text of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia before and after the amendment, MPR Decree No. II/MPR/1993 concerning the Broad Outlines of State Policy, MPR Decree Number I/MPR/2003 concerning the Review of the Material and Legal Status of MPRS Decrees and MPR RI Decrees from 1960 to 2002, and Law Number 25 of 2004 concerning the National Development Planning System. Secondary legal materials include recent academic literature and empirical data on public trust levels.

All legal materials were analyzed qualitatively and prescriptively to justify the MPR's constitutional position, formulate a typology of state policy, and design the institutional

framework. Operationally, the discussion framework is structured through four sequential stages: (a) examining the typology of constitutional interpretation to differentiate between progressive and expansive interpretations in the official restoration of the MPR; (b) conducting a normative comparison of the constitutional designs of DPSP in India and Ireland; (c) constructing the institutional engineering of a facilitative, deliberative, and directive MPR alongside a bottom-up scheme for Group Representation; and (d) formulating a normative draft for the amendment of the 1945 Constitution as a safeguard instrument against the risk of abuse and deviation from the will of the people.

3. Discussion

3.1. Typology of Constitutional Interpretation: Progressivity versus the Risk of Power Expansion

Indonesia's state system inevitably involves judicial power, such as the Constitutional Court's (*Mahkamah Konstitusi* or MK) role in interpreting institutional design, as seen in MK Decision Number 14/PUU-XI/2013 and Decision Number 55/PUU-XVII/2019. Through these decisions, the MK synchronized the model of simultaneous elections to create a coat-tail effect that could strengthen political support in parliament, thereby maintaining the effectiveness of the presidential system (Tanjung et al., 2022). The court's legal reasoning consistently harmonized the need for executive stability with the principle of representation. These questions are particularly relevant to the distinction between progressive constitutional interpretation and judicial expansion that may exceed the appropriate institutional boundaries of constitutional adjudication (Rohmah et al., 2026). However, from the perspective of Pancasila democracy, judicial or legislative actions that overhaul institutional design spark debate over whether such interpretation constitutes progressivity to uphold popular sovereignty (the Fourth Precept) or instead amounts to power expansion that culminates in democratic weakening.

To address this debate, clear analytical criteria are needed to assess the legitimacy of proposals to expand state institutions' authority. Without a clearly defined institutional design and effective constitutional constraints, proposals to strengthen state institutions, including the restoration of state policy guidelines such as the GBHN, may devolve into an idealized return to an integralistic conception of the state that risks excessive centralization of power (Satrio, 2023). This risk can be examined through the concept of abusive constitutionalism, in which constitutional mechanisms are manipulated by political elites to consolidate power and undermine democratic accountability and checks and balances (Landau, 2013; Omara, 2025). This phenomenon is associated with democratic backsliding, which may occur through executive aggrandizement and the strategic use of formally democratic institutional mechanisms to weaken existing constraints on political power (Bermeo, 2016). Dixon and Landau (2019) further demonstrate that constitutional borrowing may become abusive when constitutional models are adopted superficially or applied in ways that undermine, rather than advance, democratic principles. Although these concepts address different forms of constitutional change, they provide a broader analytical basis for examining whether institutional reforms preserve or weaken democratic constraints. Accordingly, proposals to reconstruct the MPR's constitutional role or expand its authority should be assessed not only for their formal legality but also for their institutional purpose, implications for the separation of powers, and potential effects on democratic accountability.

First, the dimension of institutional purpose distinguishes progressive constitutional interpretation from abusive institutional expansion. Progressive interpretation seeks to

address constitutional or regulatory gaps while maintaining constitutional consistency, institutional stability, and continuity in national governance. By contrast, expansive interpretation extends a state institution's authority beyond its existing scope, which is not necessarily abusive in itself. Such expansion becomes abusive when it is used to concentrate power, weaken institutional constraints, or undermine democratic accountability (Landau, 2013; Bermeo, 2016). This distinction aligns with the broader literature on abusive constitutional change, which emphasizes that the legitimacy of institutional reform must be assessed not only by its formal constitutional justification but also by its implications for democratic constraints and accountability (Dixon & Landau, 2019).

Second, the dimension of normative consistency with the Fourth Precept of Pancasila examines whether institutional reform reflects deliberative decision-making, wisdom, and inclusive political representation. A progressive interpretation should be grounded in deliberative consensus that facilitates meaningful participation by diverse social and political groups and encourages decisions oriented toward the common good. This emphasis on representation is particularly relevant to debates on strengthening Indonesia's constitutional system through Pancasila democracy (Hadi & Gandryani, 2024). A key consideration is the distinction between formal political representation and substantive inclusion. Although political institutions may provide formal channels of representation, party structures, patronage networks, and unequal access to political power may constrain diverse groups' effective participation and the realization of representative equality (Prasetyo et al., 2025). Conversely, an expansive interpretation that is insufficiently constrained by deliberative principles may enable dominant political factions or electoral elites to prioritize narrow political interests over public interests and collective welfare.

Third, the dimension of constitutional and institutional implications examines how institutional reform may affect the presidential system and the mechanisms of checks and balances. Progressive interpretation should preserve the constitutional characteristics of the presidential system while strengthening institutional accountability and maintaining an appropriate distribution of power. By contrast, an expansive interpretation that is not subject to adequate constitutional constraints may create an institutional imbalance in which the MPR's authority unduly restricts the President's constitutional autonomy. Although such an arrangement could raise concerns about similarities to Indonesia's pre-Reformasi constitutional order, restoring state policy guidelines would not necessarily recreate the institutional arrangements that existed before the constitutional amendments. The implications would depend on the precise scope of the MPR's authority, the legal status and enforceability of the state policy guidelines, the President's constitutional responsibilities, and the mechanisms available to resolve institutional conflicts. In particular, the legal consequences of non-compliance with the guidelines would be critical in determining whether they function primarily as strategic directions for national development or as instruments for exercising political control over the executive. These considerations are consistent with comparative scholarship emphasizing that constitutional reform must be assessed in relation to its institutional context and the democratic constraints governing the exercise of public power (Dixon & Landau, 2019).

Fourth, the dimension of the normative character of state policy guidelines examines the nature, scope, and legal consequences of the obligations they establish. Progressive interpretation would favor guidelines that provide normative and strategic direction for national development while remaining consistent with constitutional principles and institutional accountability. By contrast, an expansive interpretation that establishes rigid, insufficiently constrained obligations may allow political actors to use the guidelines as instruments of political pressure against state leaders. The impeachment of Indonesia's

fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid, provides a historical context for examining the relationship between constitutional authority, inter-institutional conflict, and presidential accountability. However, this episode should not be treated as direct evidence that binding state policy guidelines necessarily lead to impeachment. The key distinction is not simply whether the guidelines are legally binding, but how their binding force is defined, which institutions implement them, and whether enforcement remains subject to constitutional limitations and appropriate accountability mechanisms.

This four-dimensional indicator framework provides a systematic analytical basis for evaluating proposals to reconstruct the authority of state institutions, including the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Rather than presuming that institutional reform must conform exclusively to progressive interpretation or that every expansion of institutional authority is inherently problematic, the framework assesses whether such reforms serve legitimate constitutional purposes while preserving democratic accountability, institutional constraints, and the principles of Pancasila democracy. Changes in institutional arrangements must not transform the constitutional system into an instrument of political domination or constitutional repression. Instead, they should support the development of an inclusive national deliberative forum grounded in Pancasila, while safeguarding the constitutional distribution of power and the accountability of state institutions.

3.2. Lessons from the Directive Principles of India and Ireland for the Reconstruction of State Policy

Reconstructing state policy in Indonesia requires a strong theoretical anchor to avoid the dichotomy between executive-centric tendencies and the risk of absolute legislative supremacy. Comparative scholarship on the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) in India and the Directive Principles of Social Policy in Ireland demonstrates how non-justiciable constitutional principles can guide policymaking while preserving a distinction between constitutional objectives and judicially enforceable rights (Khaitan, 2018; Kenny & Musgrove McCann, 2022). In Indonesia, this framework can be related to the constitutional position of Pancasila and its role in shaping state institutions and public policy (Huzaeni, 2022; Arifin, 2024). Scholarship on Pancasila democracy highlights the importance of adapting democratic principles to Indonesia's constitutional and sociopolitical context, rather than uncritically adopting foreign institutional models (Basit, 2023; Rizwan, 2024). Accordingly, four fundamental dimensions are found to serve as references in formulating strategic, democratic guidelines. These dimensions are not meant to be copied directly, but used as a conceptual reference to formulate a non-justiciable state policy that strengthens the stability of the presidential system without threatening executive autonomy.

First, regarding the constitutional basis and adaptation logic. Genealogically, directive principles are products of "constitutional translation" that cross national borders, where the influence of the Weimar Constitution was highly significant in shaping the model in Ireland, which was subsequently widely adapted by India (Coffey, 2019). India's success in modifying it (Indianizing it) proves that the effectiveness of this instrument relies heavily on its capacity to adapt to domestic sociological problems (Pandya, 2021). In Indonesia, this comparative experience provides a basis for reconsidering the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) as a framework for promoting policy continuity across presidential terms. However, adopting a Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly (*Ketetapan MPR*) as its legal instrument requires further constitutional justification, particularly regarding the MPR's authority and its relationship with presidential powers under the amended 1945 Constitution. Thus, foreign models should serve as comparative references rather than templates for direct transplantation.

Second, regarding non-justiciable characteristics and executive stability. The main character of DPSP is that it cannot be directly enforced through the courts (non-justiciable), which positions political actors as the primary parties responsible for upholding constitutional imperatives (Kenny & McCann, 2022). As an instrument of political constitutionalism, these principles guide policymaking without automatically creating judicially enforceable obligations or grounds for presidential dismissal (Susanto, 2017). This design places state policy as an "ideological compass," where the people judge its accountability politically through elections, rather than using it as a legal weapon to undermine the stability of the government system.

Third, concerning synchronization within a presidential system. The main challenge of integrating state policy in Indonesia is guaranteeing the purity of executive authority so that it is not trapped in a legislative-heavy order. State policy will not conflict with presidentialism as long as it is positioned as a basic policy guideline born from the collective consensus of all the people (Sudirta, 2020). Guiding principles strengthen the development of a democratic society by ensuring orderly, planned change (Ellandra et al., 2021). Therefore, the state policy framework must be designed to avoid a technical-bureaucratic approach that would stifle the President's autonomy, and instead provide broad outlines of long-term national development agreed upon as a manifestation of popular sovereignty based on Pancasila.

Fourth, regarding synergy and developmental continuity. Comparative experience shows that directive principles act as supreme "development engineers" that ensure policy continuity across regimes. The position of state policy is an integral part of the triangle of basic state consensus that complements Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in safeguarding the ideals of the state (*staatsidee*) (Sudirta, 2020). By positioning state policy as a long-term national consensus, Indonesia's development direction will gain efficacy that transcends short-term political interests. Integrating constitutional values into the direction of national development will ultimately ensure that every stage of state policy is always oriented towards achieving social justice continuously.

3.3. Constitutional Position of the MPR in the Pancasila Presidential System: Facilitative, Deliberative, and Directive

The reconstruction of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in the contemporary state system is directed towards transforming the institution into a "National House" to strengthen inclusive democracy and expand political participation (Pratama et al., 2025). Post-amendment, the MPR structure left ambiguity regarding true representation due to a lack of clarity on who is represented by non-party elements (Asshiddiqie, 2016). This transformation is not an attempt to revive the absolute supremacy of the pre-reform era, but rather an institutional engineering to position the MPR as an intersection of various mandates without reducing the president's constitutional authority as the holder of executive power.

The first role is a facilitative position to restore popular sovereignty, which currently is no longer intact due to the abolition of the Group Envoy element (Hadi & Gandryani, 2024). Current political realities show that the culture of patronage and high political costs in elections have created structural barriers causing parliament to be dominated by the power of capital and party factions (Rosyan & Prasajo, 2024). A reflective look at the history of the MPR's composition shows that the absence of clear criteria for filling non-party seats in the past destroyed the meaning of representation itself (Ibrahim, 2026). Thus, Group Representation is significant in providing space for functional groups to break the dominance of the electoral oligarchy (Redi et al., 2020). Reactivating this pathway supports

the presidential system by helping executive policies gain broader sociological legitimacy from professional groups and indigenous communities. However, to prevent this facilitative role from being co-opted by practical political interests, a meritocracy-based recruitment design is necessary; the mechanisms will be detailed in the next section.

The second role is deliberative. The MPR is positioned as the highest deliberative forum that bridges the discursive gap between theoretical ideas and the practice of deliberation for consensus (*musyawarah mufakat*) (Suwignyo & Yuliantri, 2023). Applying this deliberative principle is an imperative within the framework of the Pancasila legal state to ensure that every strategic decision is born from a high-quality collective consensus (Hadita & Harijanti, 2022). This deliberative space in the MPR must become a dialogue arena capable of dampening political tensions between state institutions. Thus, the MPR functions as the guardian of *hikmat kebijaksanaan* (wisdom in deliberation), ensuring that every legal product reflects a stable national consensus so the President can execute government functions without the hindrance of political deadlock in parliament.

Lastly, it has a directive role. The MPR holds the authority as the determiner of strategic development directions to prevent political fragmentation that could weaken government effectiveness (Talaba, 2025). State policy is positioned as macro guidelines for state administration that provide certainty for long-term development directions beyond executive terms (Sudirta, 2020). Through the establishment of the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN), the MPR exercises a directive function ensuring that every stage of national development remains oriented towards achieving the state ideals inclusively agreed upon. This directive position anchors the presidential system, ensuring that leadership transitions do not halt the nation's strides toward the long-term welfare targets outlined in the Constitution.

3.4. Multi-Stage Bottom-Up Scheme: The Engineering of Non-Partisan Group Envoy Recruitment

Reimplementing Group Representation demands recruitment mechanisms that can break the chains of political patronage. Historical experience shows that the failure of non-party representation in the past was often caused by the lack of objective criteria, so the filling of positions was more of a subjective appointment by those in power (Ibrahim, 2026). To avoid repeating such mistakes, this research proposes a multi-stage, bottom-up recruitment scheme that integrates grassroots aspirations with strict meritocratic verification at the national level.

The first stage is inclusive grassroots screening (bottom-up). Unlike the territorial-electoral political representation system, Group Representation must emerge from functional organizations, professional associations, and indigenous communities with clear legal standing and proven track records. These groups are mandated to propose their internal representation based on concrete contributions in their respective fields (Redi et al., 2020). Civil society associations can represent social interests, perspectives, and constituencies beyond conventional electoral mechanisms (Urbinati & Warren, 2008; Mendonça, 2008). However, organizational affiliation alone does not guarantee democratic legitimacy; meaningful representation also requires participatory internal decision-making, accountability to constituents, and responsiveness to the interests being represented (Guo & Musso, 2007; Bolleyer, 2024). This step is crucial to ensure that the figures sent to the MPR truly carry sociological and functional mandates, rather than figures "entrusted" by political party elites through the back door of power.

The second stage involves meritocratic verification by an independent committee. To guarantee professionalism, the selection process must not be conducted by the General

Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or KPU), which by design focuses more on electoral contests, but rather by a "Collegium of Verifiers" consisting of credible academics, legal experts, and interfaith figures. This committee tests the integrity and scientific competence of envoy candidates to ensure they can provide expert input in national policy formulation (Saputra et al., 2024). This non-partisan selection mechanism aims to minimize clientelism and the high political costs that have long blocked professional figures from entering the government system. Political connections and patronage can distort recruitment decisions and result in the selection of less competent individuals, reinforcing the need for impartial verification mechanisms (Colonnelli et al., 2020).

The third stage is crystallization and appointment. Candidates who pass strict verification are then appointed as members of the MPR, with tenures that are not necessarily permanent like legislative members, but can be periodic according to the needs of the nation's strategic agenda. The presence of experts and practitioners who represent expertise will anchor the government in formulating more accurate, measurable, and evidence-based policies. With a multi-layered recruitment design starting from the bottom, Group Representation will transform from mere "rubber stamps" into technocratic pillars that strengthen the effectiveness of the presidential system within the corridors of Pancasila deliberative democracy.

3.5. Reconstruction of the 1945 Constitution Articles: Normative Formula and the Prevention of Abusive Constitutionalism

The materialization of the institutional design of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) as the "National House" and the institutionalization of the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) require highly precise constitutional engineering. Without strict norm formulations, good intentions to restore sociological representation could slip into practices of abusive constitutionalism, where constitutional amendments are manipulated to unilaterally accumulate power and tear down executive autonomy (Omara, 2025; Satrio, 2023). Therefore, the reconstruction of the 1945 Constitution must be carried out operationally and in a limited manner, incorporating safeguard mechanisms ensuring the MPR's new authority is not reduced to a political weapon.

First, the reconstruction of the MPR's facilitative function is executed through the amendment of Article 2 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. The proposed normative formulation is: "The People's Consultative Assembly consists of members of the House of Representatives, members of the Regional Representative Council, and Group Representation elected through non-partisan expertise-based mechanisms, to be further regulated by law." The addition of the phrase "non-partisan expertise-based mechanisms" is the constitutional foundation for applying the multi-stage bottom-up scheme detailed previously, aimed at blocking the infiltration of political party oligarchies. Delegating the regulation to the statutory level will provide space for the formation of an independent selection body that verifies the functional expertise of these envoys (Saputra, 2024). Through this formulation, the principle of meritocracy is truly institutionalized as the main pillar of substantive popular sovereignty.

Second, the reconstruction of the MPR's directive function is carried out by amending Article 3 of the 1945 Constitution to add a new paragraph. The offered normative formulation is: "The People's Consultative Assembly has the authority to establish the Broad Outlines of State Policy as guidelines for the macro direction of national development." The reuse of the GBHN nomenclature in this constitution does not signify a return to past authoritarian paradigms, but rather a GBHN explicitly redefined as directive principles. The institutionalization of this article provides legal certainty binding

all state instruments to align their development visions into a single basic state consensus (Ellandra et al., 2021, p. 202; Sudirta, 2020). This normative construction firmly establishes the President as an independent holder of executive power, no longer a subordinate or mandatory of the assembly.

Third, creating a formula to prevent abusive constitutionalism is essential to maintain the balance of the presidential system. Adapting the non-justiciable characteristics of the directive principles instrument (Kenny & McCann, 2022), the constitution must provide an absolute restriction on the legal implications of the GBHN. Therefore, a safeguard clause needs to be added (for example in Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution or the Transitional Provisions) with the formulation: "The President's failure to achieve the targets of the Broad Outlines of State Policy cannot be used as a juridical basis to dismiss the President during their term of office, but instead becomes an object of political assessment by the people in general elections." This limitation clause is the final synthesis to maintain the purity of executive authority and prevent parliament from politicizing impeachment (Susanto, 2017). Through these three normative formulas, the restoration of the MPR's authority will be locked in the corridor of progressive interpretation, so that Group Representation and the GBHN will not manifest as instruments of legislative tyranny, but rather as the main pillars of an inclusive and technocratic Pancasila deliberative democracy.

4. Conclusion

Reconstructing the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) by strengthening the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) and reactivating Group Representation represents a fundamental effort to restore inclusive sovereignty within the Pancasila presidential system. This research concludes that such restoration must not be understood as a romanticized return to the absolute supremacy of the pre-reform MPR, but as progressive constitutional engineering to close gaps in sociological representation and the fragmentation of national development directions.

The specific contribution (novelty) of this research lies in two original model propositions. First, the adoption of the directive principles model from India and Ireland is not executed rawly, but through a process of "GBHN Indonesianization." Unlike previous studies that tend to position state policy as an imperative instrument that threatens executive autonomy, this research presents the GBHN as directive principles that are politically and morally binding (non-justiciable). The main distinction is the inclusion of a safeguard clause in the formulation of Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution, which explicitly prohibits the non-achievement of the GBHN from being used as a juridical reason for presidential impeachment, ensuring the purity of the presidential system is protected from the risks of abusive constitutionalism.

Second, this research introduces a selection mechanism for Group Representation through a meritocracy-based, multi-stage, bottom-up system. While previous studies stopped at the urgency of restoring Group Representation, this research goes further by formulating a non-partisan recruitment scheme. Through this scheme, functional representation is born from a competency verification process by an independent body at the grassroots level (professions/groups), which is then crystallized to the national level. This mechanism acts as an antithesis to past subjective appointment practices while also serving as a fortress to minimize political party oligarchy infiltration into the MPR body. Thus, this reconstruction provides a concrete roadmap for realizing inclusive deliberative democracy, where the MPR acts as a grand house for all people's mandates—political, territorial, or functional—in determining the nation's future direction.

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