Indonesia is a state with its uniquely own Pancasila as a national ideology. More than just an ideology, Pancasila has been proved multiple times acts as a unifying factor for Indonesia. Furthermore, many scholars and political leaders of Indonesia defined that the state identity of Indonesia is deeply embedded within Pancasila. Pancasila is the unifying factor for Indonesia, which means that multiculturalism, various religions, ethnic groups, and races, could exist and all be tied up within Pancasila, which is already well-known in the domestic sector. But the question that arose is, how do other states view Indonesia? Does the Pancasila identity featured by Indonesia also seen by other states in the international sector? To answer this question, one must clarify with the International Relations approach as a relevant discipline. Through this paper, the results found out that there have been many attempts to show that the state identity of Indonesia is embedded with Pancasila in the international sector.

Keywords: Pancasila; State Identity; Unifying Factor; Constructivism; Recontextualization

A. Introduction

In the vision of Sukarno in one of his national speeches, “kapal yang membawa kita ke-Indonesia-Merdeka itu ialah Kapal Persatuan”, which means “the ship that brings us to a sovereign Indonesia is a unity ship”. Indonesia is a country with a very diverse culture, race, religion, and every other human aspect and is well-known for its unity and multiculturalism. The motto “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” which literally means “Unity in diversity” has been widely manifested since Indonesia got its independence and is still being pursued greatly by the nation up until today be it either as a state policy or implemented in the daily lives of its people. In brief, multiculturalism is a thing that keeps on being pursued not only by the government, but by the whole people in every sector and every sphere in Indonesia.

However, this path has not always been flawless and smooth for Indonesia. Every government coming from different eras seem to face a challenge to unify Indonesia and put their resistance towards extremist movements or separatist movements (Emmerson, 2000). As a country with the
largest Muslim population in the world, it is such a unique situation occurred when a country that consists of most Muslim people does not become an Islamic state, and it is unlikely to become one in the future. The fact is that in every state, there are always separatist movements aroused and Indonesia is no different.

However, Indonesia managed to muffle those separatist movements from time to time using numerous ways. One notable act for that is when Indonesia gave special privileges to the Aceh region, where they could freely apply the Sharia Law (law based on the Islamic religion) instead of the national law, but only within the region. Such an act is argued to be successful in suppressing extremist movements to rise in Indonesia (Ayoub, 2013).

Separatist movements are an ongoing issue that Indonesia is facing, and will likely persist, because of the archipelagic nature of the country, especially those on the verge of territory. Thus, in analyzing separatist movements, geopolitics and historical aspects are two main considerations to magnify the issue. In that case, this paper is going through critical geopolitics and historical analyses within the constructivism framework to discover the implications of multiculturalism (in the form of Pancasila) to unite and decide Indonesia’s political behavior ideals, which this paper found that Pancasila has embedded into Indonesia’s state identity, and therefore the articulation of it brings different political behavior ideals or interests.

Geopolitically, Indonesia is a very strategic country that lies between two continents (Asia and Australia) and between two oceans (the Pacific and Indian Oceans). Indonesia is also considered the largest archipelago in the world. The geographical position of natural resources and the number and capacity of the population have put Indonesia into a battleground between major countries (Sakti & Widodo, 2012). In that case, challenges arose for Indonesia both domestically and internationally. Groups in the outskirt of the main territories, which often claim that they have a distinct history with Indonesia’s nationhood, the extremist movements who disagree with Pancasila as their national ideology, have always been the challenge for Indonesia, leaving Pancasila to act as the problem solving for every party (Arif, 2016).

On the other hand, Pancasila has proven its function to stabilize the country and created a sphere where multiculturalism could be broadly applied. The post-Suharto democratization process has shown a new space for the previously oppressed identities to express more on themselves (Hoon, 2017). Pancasila, looking at the first principle, “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” (Belief in the Almighty God), which indirectly require Indonesian people to at least have religion as their personal identity, also is a principle that acknowledged at least 6 main religions that are thriving in Indonesia (Islam, Christian, Catholic, Buddhism, Confucian, Hindu). In addition, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is fundamental in conditioning the multicultural nature of Indonesia. This function is also supported by the posture of Indonesia’s national defense which is based on the concept of Wawasan Nusantara (Indonesian Archipelagic Vision) and Ketahanan Nasional (National Resilience), which inherited into the concept of Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (Total People’s Defence and Security System).

Against this backdrop, this paper aims to seek the articulation of Pancasila, which acts as a unifying factor in the domestic sector, which enhanced the ideation of Pancasila in their political behavior ideals and state interests in the international world. This paper would observe any implications, the key importance of Pancasila as a unifying factor of Indonesia, and also the articulation that Indonesia has made to portray Pancasila as their state identity in the international sector. Hence, this paper would like to analyze this issue
considering a critical geopolitics approach for Pancasila.

B. Discussion

“But if Indonesia truly implements Pancasila as its weltanschauung, one philosophical standpoint, Pancasila is the unifying factor, which I am really sure, from Sabang to Merauke, Indonesia can be unified by Pancasila alone,” said Sukarno during one of his speeches in 1958 (Latif, 2012). Pancasila is argued several times by the likes of Yudi Latif, Syaiful Arif, and several other scholars, as Indonesia’s weltanschauung, just like Sukarno has said before. But the question arose from this, is the implementation of Pancasila going to affect the country, as a part of identity shaping? To answer this question, this paper will be going through an array of historical and geographical analyses. Authors recognize the importance of clarifying the state identity of Pancasila through the domestic sector first to further analyze the recontextualization in the international area.

Historically speaking, the nationhood of Indonesia is a social reality. Not just a mere political statement (Latif, 2011). Youth Pledge (Indonesian: Sumpah Pemuda) is a memorable moment that allowed us to envision that the youth of Indonesia had declared their nationhood 17 years before they gained their independence. Furthermore, Sukarno once said, Indonesia is a character community that is grown through communal experiences. The one that unites Indonesia is the same experience of oppression, experiences of cruelty, experiences of colonization together. In those experiences, the people of Indonesia started to realize its common human dignity, i.e., Indonesia’s dignity. Sukarno’s ideation of Pancasila and Indonesia’s character is akin to Anderson’s concept of imagined communities. As Anderson later explained, the sense of community or shared imagination of being in the same community is further affirmed by shared experiences (Anderson, 2006). Indonesia with the colonization of the Dutch before they got their independence, truly had so many shared experiences which made them united as how they are.

On the other hand, multiculturalism has always been a notable thing in Indonesia (Zarbaliyev, 2017). We can see further from Indonesia’s national motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika that it truly is a diverse nation that aims for unity. A nation-state comprising 17,508 islands (6,000 inhabited), on which resides a population of approximately 246 million people representing over three hundred different ethnic groups (including immigrants of Chinese, Arab and Indian descent) and nearly 250 distinct languages. In terms of religious diversity, nearly 86.1% of the population identifies themselves as Muslim; about 5.7% as Protestant, 3% as Roman Catholic, 1.8% as Hindu, and the remaining 3.4% are unspecified and/or categorized as Other. Despite such heterogeneity, the modern geopolitical norm of constituting sovereign nation-states dictates that there exists a mechanism of unification. Pancasila, as Sukarno’s ideological blueprint, tendered a compelling solution to the challenge of ethnic and religious diversity (Acac, 2015).

We have seen several scholars argue that Pancasila is a viable solution to Indonesia’s heterogeneity. It is argued that Pancasila as Indonesia’s weltanschauung is strengthening the form of Indonesia’s foundation, especially in applying social values that live in society: customs, culture, ethnicity, and religion (Yunaldi, 2020).

However, is Pancasila truly able to represent every ethnicity, and every religion? There are two distinct views regarding Pancasila as Indonesia’s weltanschauung. Namely, those who truly supported it, and those who saw it as something abstract and not able to resolve the multicultural problems of Indonesia. The latter position argued that certain cases aroused, be it separatist movements or
political inclusivity for certain ethnicities, are examples of it.

The following cases occurred proving that geopolitically, Indonesia struggled to represent everything. The case of the Free Papua Movement (Indonesian: Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) and the Free Aceh Movement (Indonesian: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) are two most famous examples of Indonesia’s separatist movements. Not to mention the emergence of these movements has been influenced by the collapse of the Suharto government in 1998 and East Timor’s decision to independence in the United Nations-sponsored referendum of August 31, 1999. Webster argued that movements in Aceh and Papua have become a backlash for Indonesia, which built a sense of identity, considering themselves to be ‘nation-states’ even if they are not yet nation-states (Webster, 2007). In that case, it is safe to assume that Pancasila has failed to represent these corner parts of Indonesia. Several scholars even said that Aceh also experienced alienation from Indonesia. In addition, it is also found that the Indonesian military has been applying extensive human rights abuse upon Aceh and Papua, and both are documented. Niksch later argued that Aceh itself has a distinct history with Indonesia as a nation, which is the main cause of Aceh’s separatism and alienation. Aceh was an independent kingdom from the 15th century until the beginning of the 20th century, which makes it a different historical background from Indonesia’s nationhood (Niksch, 2002).

For the case of Papua, it is not much different from what Aceh is experiencing. When the Republic of Indonesia became an independent nation-state, the Dutch government began preparing Papua for its independence to separate from both the Dutch and Indonesian governments. The preparations were the formation of a Papuan legislative body, flag, and national anthem. However, the government of Indonesia declared Papua as part of the republic in the New York Agreement in 1962 without any Papuan participation. They further sought the right of freedom to the UN in 1964 and then created the Free Papua Movement. It was found that historical aspects might be the main cause of the Papua separatist movement (Lele, 2021). Ever since the beginning of the process of integrating the Papua region into Indonesian territory, Indonesia’s founding fathers have had different ideas about the Papua region. Sukarno and Muh. Yamin thought that the territory of Indonesia is the entire territory of the former Dutch East Indies, including Papua. Their desire is reinforced by the fact that Papua is a region with abundant natural resources. However, Moh. Hatta thought that the Papua region was an area ethnographically different from Indonesia (Febrianti, Arum, Dermawan, & Akim, 2019).

Throughout these several examples, we have seen that there is a linkage between maintaining Pancasila and Indonesia’s state identity and its political behavior ideals. This paper would assert the geopolitical aspect as its standpoint to analyze Indonesia’s political behavior ideals, as it is important to analyze further the implications and causes of Pancasila as Indonesia’s state identity.

We have seen several domestic cases to apprehend Indonesia’s political ideals in this paper, especially regarding separatist movements in the domestic sector. In the international sector, the geographical position of natural resources and the number and capacity of the population have put Indonesia a favored “battleground” for major countries (Sakti & Widodo, 2012). Indonesia, upon handling this issue, has its concept of “kepentingan Nasional” (Indonesia’s national interest), which means to keep its ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and national defense and security as Indonesia’s national interest or objectives.

Normally the issue a country is having with external parties is regarding the first three subjects mentioned: ideological, political, and economic. One notably acts
that Indonesia did several years ago, which showed a direct implication to showing its true identity to the world, was Indonesia’s decision to join Non-Aligned Movement, later followed by its role in Afro-Asian Conference/Bandung Conference (Indonesian: Konferensi Asia Afrika/KAA). Recently, it is found that Indonesia’s role in KAA and Non-Aligned Movement was also to assert their objective of the “kepentingan nasional” (Akbar, Subagyo, & Oktaviani, 2020). At that time, two major power blocs were fighting over how to influence their ideologies in other countries. But by joining the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia once again showed its identity and stuck with Pancasila, rather than joining one of the powerful blocs.

This review of related literature has found that Indonesia through Pancasila is able to become a unifying factor for their nationhood, but still however have certain struggles regarding separatist movements and external issues due to the political behavior ideals that they want to maintain. The identity of Indonesia which reflects through Pancasila is also determinant in shaping the state’s interests and actions.

On the bright side, multiculturalism in Indonesia somehow is assured inside Pancasila, which has always been Sukarno’s dream. Although it is not always the case in a conflicting political interest, where ethnic inclusivity and identity politics still occurred (Lan, 2011). Often times, the difficulties that Indonesia had in terms of political interest were brought into the cultural field. The case of Ahok, the former Jakarta governor on its re-election is the perfect example of it. But it is still fair to say that many conflicts still occurred, based on religious and ethnic differences, but those conflicts are mostly heated up as the influx of political interests. Asides from political interests, Indonesia is a field where multiculturalism is broadly applied in its social reality. Therefore, this paper would further analyze the articulation of Pancasila as a unifying belief and how it affects Indonesia’s political behavior ideals and policy choices in both international and domestic sectors.

The concept and study of state identity, culture, and norms require a theoretical framework that will help us understand this issue comprehensively. In addition, this paper based its finding on the concept of critical geopolitics. The basis that underlies critical geopolitics is that intellectuals of statecraft construct ideas about places; these ideas have influence and reinforce their political behavior ideals and policy choices, and these ideas affect how people process their own notions of places and politics (Fouberg, Murphy, & Blij, 2012). Thus, the discourses of critical geopolitics must be put into an understanding of the identities and interests of actors constructed by shared ideas. Therefore, the theory of constructivism becomes an explanatory framework that is considered appropriate and critical in explaining the political behavior ideals and interests with Pancasila as its basic unifying factor (state identity).

Constructivism argued that there is an importance of shared ideas, as Wendt further emphasized that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007). This is the foundation of certain identities and interests of purposive actors. Thus, states act according to a joint influence of identity and interest. Wendt also interpreted that identity is a prerequisite for interest because an actor cannot know what he wants until he knows who he is (Wildavsky, 1994). Furthermore, constructivism disagrees that the structures of human association are constructed by material phenomena, as defined by the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism, but it does not deny the existence of objective facts. Constructivism explained that it recognized the existence of material elements or factors, but these factors do not play a crucial role in this theory; instead, it indicates that shared ideas or ideational

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aspects are the most important elements in international relations.

This theory is operationalized through analyzing Pancasila in a constructivism framework, which focused on the creation of Pancasila as Indonesia’s state identity as socially constructed, which is further articulated and recontextualized by their respective leaders in each era contemporary, as the state identity creates notions based on the interpretation of the people and the leaders, which then actualized through their state interests and actions. The theory will follow Alexandrov’s concept of state identity in international relations, which addresses the relationship between state identity, culture, and norms and provides a systematic review of the state identity approaches (Alexandrov, 2003).

The operationalization will be further emphasized in three divided parts: (1) the background and philosophical ideas of Pancasila (etymology and terminology), which would allow us to envision the common ground of the identity shaping of Indonesia through Pancasila; (2) followed by the emphasized of Pancasila as a unifying factor for Indonesia and its challenges, which would allow us to envision the articulation of the shared beliefs and the challenges would also provide us the result of their political behavior ideals and state interests; (3) lastly, we would clarify the recontextualization of Pancasila throughout different eras (Old Order, New Order, Reformation), which would allow us to envision that the state identity of Indonesia is deeply embodied through Pancasila, and different contextualization or notion by surrounding actors would lead into different state identities and state interests.

Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the state identity shaping of Indonesia through Pancasila that will be discussed in this paper. Followed by the articulation and recontextualization of the post-colonialism era as the common ground of Indonesia’s state interests and behaviors. The figure consists of state identity as the main variable of the discussed matter, which is shaped by other approaches, referring to Alexandrov’s state identity measurement, which are the domestic political culture and norms, international culture and norms, and the image of others.

Again, the state identity of Indonesia is Pancasila itself, while the domestic political culture and norms that shaped Pancasila state identity are the shared beliefs domestically that Pancasila is the unifying factor for Indonesia and Indonesia’s weltanschauung, the international culture and norms pursued by Pancasila is the multiculturalism and human rights, and the image of other is how Asian and African countries see Indonesia is akin to them through Pancasila, and Indonesia is such a multicultural state.

According to constructivist reasoning, the interests of states are shaped by their identities, while identities (and therefore interests) themselves are subject to change in the process of interaction (Alexandrov, 2003). Therefore, the recontextualization of Pancasila throughout the eras will be explained to let us see through the everchanging identities (context of Pancasila) and interests. Thus, this paper argues that Pancasila became the articulation of unifying beliefs in the domestic sector, and the idea is then reinforced through the recontextualization of Pancasila towards Indonesia’s political behavior ideals, interests, and policy choices throughout the times.
Pancasila acts as the shared imagination for the people of Indonesia as a unifying belief to make them unified as a country. The application of Pancasila as Indonesia’s national ideology also shows that the identity of Indonesia is embedded deeply within Pancasila itself. On the other hand, the idea of multiculturalism itself in contemporary political discourse and in political philosophy reflects a debate about how to understand and respond to the challenges associated with cultural diversity based on ethnic, national, and religious differences (Song, 2010).

Pancasila is indeed the backbone of Indonesia to apply multiculturalism. As what has been stated in the background, Pancasila itself is a set of five principles enunciated by Sukarno to fend off demands for an Islamic state and to reconcile the cultural and religious diversity of the embryonic Republic of Indonesia (Ramage, 1997). In addition, Pancasila as the ideology and guideline of the nation must be implemented or grounded by every Indonesian citizen in order to maintain diversity (Muhtada & Diniyanto, 2021).

Anderson’s imagined communities is the embodiment of Pancasila and the perfect explanation of Indonesia’s nationhood. Sukarno argued that Indonesia’s nationhood is built upon shared experiences. Shared experiences of being colonized, shared experiences of cruelty, struggle, et cetera, have built Indonesia’s nationhood into a unity that is tied with Pancasila. This also explains that several areas in Indonesia, especially those in the corner areas do not feel akin to Indonesia, as they might have a distinct history with Indonesia as a whole and might be different geopolitically. Therefore, Anderson’s imagined communities are such a perfect example to clarify the situation of Indonesia and Pancasila. Indonesia in its development as a nation, with all the uniqueness inherent in multicultural, Indonesia gets its ideological and philosophical umbrella under Pancasila (Habibah, Setyowati, & Fatmawati, 2022).

Indeed, Pancasila has proven its effectiveness as a unifying factor for Indonesia, but at the same time it also backlashes to them. As a “shared imagination”, Anderson argued that shared experience is a determinant factor to unite and create the imagination. Indonesia in general would agree that they have shared experiences, especially colonization. But that is not the case for everyone. Certain ethnic or separatist movements who feel that they have a different historical background from Indonesia’s national history would hardly feel that Pancasila is a unifying factor for them. Those who claimed that they have different historical backgrounds from Indonesia are mostly those in the corners of Indonesia, notably Papua and Aceh. Another determinant factor for Papua might be that they have different races and ethnicity compared to the majority of the Indonesian people. We have also seen that Timor Leste got their independence and refused to join the Republic of Indonesia, as they felt that they do not belong to Indonesia. This paper sees that Pancasila plays a determinant role in the view of critical geopolitics, as Pancasila acts as the embodiment of critical geopolitics, which allows them to construct ideas about Indonesia as how they portrayed Indonesia. The idea would then influence and reinforce Indonesia’s political behavior ideals and policy choices, and the idea would also affect how people process their own notions of Indonesia as a nation and its politics.

To substantiate the analysis, the author conducted an interview with Syaiful Arif, who is at the time occupied as a Director of Pusat Studi Pemikiran Pancasila (Center for the Study of Pancasila), a former Expert in Unit Kerja Presiden - Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila (Presidential Work Unit - Pancasila Ideology Development). This interview greatly enhanced the analysis and discussions part of this paper, as the author
believes that Arif is such a perfect fit to provide profound and actual data for the study and research of this paper.

1. **Background and Philosophical Ideas of Pancasila (Etymology and Terminology)**

Before we advanced with the main analysis, the author acknowledged the importance of breaking down the terminology and etymology of Pancasila, as a background for the analysis. This section is important to address the position of Pancasila as the dynamic factor of Indonesia’s political behavior ideals and the ideation of Pancasila as a unifying factor. As we surf on the etymology and terminology of Pancasila, this section in hope would put us into consideration that Pancasila is a crucial variable to analyze Indonesia’s political behavior and policy choices.

Pancasila in a brief etymological explanation is a combination of two words: *panca* and *sila*, *panca* means “five”, and *sila* means “principle”. It basically means five principles for a nation and state. It is a state ideology introduced by the first President of Indonesia, Sukarno, which he introduced in an assembly held by *Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan* (BPUPK) – Investigation Agency for the Preparation of Independence on June 1st, 1945 (Herlambang, 2017).

Pancasila itself consists of five principles: (1) *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Belief in the Almighty God), (2) *Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab* (Just and Civilized Humanity), (3) *Persatuan Indonesia* (Unity of Indonesia), (4) *Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan / Perwakilan* (Democracy Guided by the Inner Wisdom in Deliberations / Representations), and (5) *Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia* (Social Justice for All Indonesian People) which Prof. Notonagoro argued as five noble values that are wholly integrated, diverted parts in a union (Mudhofir, 1996).

Furthermore, Arif mentioned in the interview that it is important for this paper to address Pancasila’s etymology and terminology to clarify the ground of Pancasila and it will be so determinant for us to analyze further the effectivity of Pancasila as a unifying factor. He said that the etymology of Pancasila was written in two Indonesian classic literature, the first one, written in a book titled *Sutasoma* by Mpu Tantular, and the second one, written in a book titled *Nagarakertagama* by Mpu Prapanca, which mentioned Pancasila word in it. ‘Pancasila’ mentioned in those two books came from the Majapahit era of Indonesia, and the name itself is adopted from the five moral principles in Buddhism. And after, on June 1st, 1945, when Sukarno suggested national principles in an assembly held by BPUPK, it is said that a linguist suggested Sukarno for the name Pancasila (Arif, 2021). Thus, Pancasila came up as a name for Indonesia’s national principle.

He also mentioned that to understand the terminology of Pancasila, we need to refer back to Sukarno’s speech on June 1st, 1945, where Sukarno explained two terminologies of Pancasila, as *gründslag*, and *weltanschauung*. As *gründslag*, Pancasila means a state’s philosophy. While Pancasila as *weltanschauung* which means Pancasila is the views of life/worldview of the people. In the speech framework, Sukarno did not define Pancasila *weltanschauung* as a mere ideology, but he compared it with other famous world ideologies. He compared Pancasila with Hitler’s national-socialism, Lenin’s Marxism, Japan’s *Tennoo Koodoo Seishin*, and Saudi’s Islam. In a brief, Sukarno mentioned Pancasila as *weltanschauung* implicitly means Pancasila as ideology. But Sukarno was
more comfortable with the word weltanschauung instead, which is a German word for views of life/worldview. Thus, Pancasila as gründsatz means that Pancasila as a philosophical system, which shifted into weltanschauung if Pancasila is used into how certain social subjects view the world or views of life. Furthermore, Pancasila would become an ideology if then it will be done practically in the social life of Indonesian people, or institutional in the form of social institutions, politics, and society in general (Arif, 2021).
However, those two philosophical ideas mentioned above are still within the framework of Sukarno’s speech on June 1st, 1945. We must take note that later on, the speech on June 1st, 1945, decided by BPUPK to be the main material in the formulation of the nation’s principle, which was carried out by Panitia Sembilan (Committee 9) chaired by Sukarno on June 22nd, until later ratified on August 18th to become part of the opening of the Constitution. After entering the 22nd June – 18th August phase, Pancasila is no longer Sukarno’s sole idea, and has turned into a unity in a consensus of the founding fathers of the nation, although Sukarno is the leader of BPUPK and PPKI.
Subsequently, the terminology that has been created on June 1st would later be developed into a national principle. The basis of the state is not an sich basic philosophy, as proposed by Sukarno, the basis of the state is the formalization of the basic philosophy of the state which was proposed and developed by the founding fathers of the nation and became a national agreement which basically turns Pancasila from basic philosophy into norms, laws, and constitutions. In that case, Pancasila after the BPUPK assembly has transformed into fundamental norms or gründnorm, but at the same time is not at the level of the law/constitution itself, but its nature is “meta-legal”, based on the hierarchy of the modern legal system (Herlambang, 2017).
Thus, this is the formal terminology of Pancasila as the state principle, but in its development, the basic norms must be practiced. In its definition, ideology is a summation of aspects of philosophy and worldview of life, and not all philosophies can be considered as principles to live a life, despite all views of life are depart from a philosophical system as its foundation (Arif, 2021). However, it is important for us to know that there are some things that are considered mere parts of traditions or cultural values that are not structured systematically and philosophically, and thus, it is important to understand Pancasila as an ideology.

2. Pancasila Acts as Unifying Factor and its Challenges
In explaining this, as suggested by Arif, it is best for us to look back at Sukarno’s speech on June 1st and the background on why Pancasila was the one that got accepted by the members of BPUPK as the basis of the state despite Islamism also fought for it. That is why this paper considered adding the previous section before analyzing Pancasila as a unifying factor, to give us the geopolitical-historical background of Pancasila and it is meant as a unifying factor since it is created. Furthermore, it is also important to see from the sociological context of the acceptance from the Indonesian people towards Pancasila, starting from its birth, formulation, and ratification.
If we look at the BPUPK assembly, there was a clash between two major ideologies, first is Islam which insisted to make Islamism (religion) ideology as the basis of the state, and second, the ideology of nationalism. But then, these two ideologies experienced a dreadlock in the assembly, until then the Pancasila proposed by Sukarno became the red
line or meeting point between Islamism and Nationalism, simply because Pancasila is capable to bridge those two ideologies of religion and nationalism, by proposing nationalism as the most important value (first principle) in Pancasila as proposed by Sukarno in his speech on June 1st, 1945 as Sukarno realized that in the pluralistic nation society, the most important thing is the unity itself and that unity is the substance of the ideology of nationalism, thus the core of Indonesia’s nationalism is Unity in Diversity (Arif, 2021).

When Sukarno made unity as the substance of nationalism as the first principle, Sukarno intended to make “unity” as Indonesia’s main principle as its national principle, and did not stop at that, Sukarno’s initiation included the element of the precept of “Believe in the Almighty God” as the basis of the fifth principle, which means a commitment to religious ideology. In that case, this fifth principle is intended to make groups with religious beliefs feel included, and Sukarno purposely put it as the fifth principle, which means this principle is the basis or foundation for other precepts, according to the speech on June 1st (Nasution & Bachroem, 1947). Thus, Pancasila from the very time it has been established, its meant to be a unifying element of society, especially in the context of the BPUPK assembly. Another reason why Pancasila ideology got chosen and accepted by the community and members of BPUPK is that it can embrace all aspects of ethnicity, religion, and ideology. The ideology of Pancasila can be called a Nationalistic Religious ideology, which is the characteristic of Indonesia by unifying its religious dimension, without eliminating the dimension of Nationalism (Arif, 2021). This is also the uniqueness of Indonesia, knowing that most European countries only rely on its Nationalism and strip off its religious elements instead.

However, knowing that Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, seems like it is also reasonable for them to be an Islamic country instead. But why does it not? The presence of Pancasila and its critical geopolitical position is the answer to that question. As Ayoub argued, Indonesia is not an Islamic state, and it is unlikely to become one (Ayoub, 2013). Indonesia is indeed a pluralistic state, although most of the population embraces Islam, but looking at Indonesia’s historical dimension, especially in fighting for the rights and independence of Indonesia, almost every ethnicity, religion, and race, joined hand in hand to fight for the country. Furthermore, the majority of Muslims in Indonesia who fought for independence are affiliated with nationalist and socialist organizations. Looking at Sukarno himself is a Muslim, but at the same time, he founded Indonesian National Party (with nationalism ideology). Thus, the establishment of Indonesia has not been built by certain religious sectors or religious identity movements, but it is built upon modern social/political movements. (Arif, 2021) This further enhanced the shared beliefs between the people that Pancasila embraced any elements of Indonesia.

Another challenge arose that this paper would like to analyze in the discourse is regarding separatist movements. As what has been stated in previous parts, Aceh claimed to have a distinct historical background with Indonesian nationhood and is not akin to Indonesian nationhood (Niksch, 2002). While for the case of Papua, racial, cultural, and ethnic differences are the main barriers for them. According to Arif, to analyze the situation, it takes deeper than just understanding the ideology of Pancasila, and briefly speaking, the way out for this issue is the integration between the central government and the people of Aceh and Papua itself. It is fair to assume
that they hardly would get the shared beliefs of Indonesian nationhood with Pancasila as the unifying factor. It is also acknowledged that there are several other factors, such as injustice, unequal distribution, and most notably historical differences, that play a part in arising the extremist movements in the corner part of Indonesia. But several acts have also been made by the government to resist the movement, for Aceh in the context of the territory itself, the central government has specifically stipulated a special autonomy law that grants Aceh a regional privilege that allows them to apply the Islamic Law within the region freely. While for the case of Papua, Arif argued, if the central government is responsive and puts its attention to the region, also minimizing disparities between regions, it will resist the chances that those regions dissever. However, if we are referring to GAM and OPM which are separatist groups, a holistic approach in terms of national security is needed and could not rely on ideology alone, so long as it is all within the Pancasila framework (Arif, 2021).

Practically, two main values in Pancasila, namely the 3rd and the 5th principles, are the solution for separatist movements and groups. Briefly, if they want to pursue the Unity of Indonesia (3rd principle), Indonesia must uphold Social Justice for All Indonesian People (5th principle). Thus, since the very first time, Pancasila is meant to be the unifying factor for Indonesia as the embodiment of the shared beliefs and shared imagination of Indonesia’s nationhood lies upon Pancasila and their shared history or fate, and the domestic challenges that arose are inevitable but at the same time, the implementation of Pancasila is always the best option to muffle down the internal struggle.

3. Recontextualization of Pancasila

The following discourse would mostly refer to Sukarno’s speech on June 1st, 1945, Sukarno’s speech when he opened the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, and Sukarno’s speech in front of the United Nations on September 30th, 1960. Followed by the articulation and interpretation of Pancasila after Orde Lama (Old Order) Sukarno’s era, which is Orde Baru (New Order) and the Reformation era. The following discourse will allow us to envision the contextualization of Pancasila based on the interpretation of the people and the leaders of Indonesia. This paper finds that every era produced a different interpretation of Pancasila and was used as an instrument based on the authorities’ contextualization.

First, we would discuss the contextualization of Pancasila according to Sukarno. According to Arif, referring to Sukarno’s speech on June 1st, 1945, Pancasila’s vision in terms of geopolitics is visionary. It is shown when Sukarno said that the 2nd principle of Pancasila (Just and Civilized Humanity) means internationalism. Internationalism as in the nationalism principle in a broad context, which is the international context. It is also likely to say that Sukarno again envisioned Pancasila as a unifying factor even in the international context. Internationalism means active participation in building relations (brotherhood) between nations and the world that does not participate in developing chauvinism, colonialism, and imperialism. Furthermore, the 2nd principle has a very progressive geopolitics value, which pursues Indonesia to always be involved in international politics and international relations in the fight for justice (Arif, 2021).

But how does Indonesia portray itself in the international world? Again, referring to Sukarno’s speeches, he once emphasized that he “spoke on behalf of [his] brothers in Asia and Africa”. In making this claim, he represented...
himself as the leader of Asian and African nations, aiming to end colonialism (Yeremia, 2020). Indonesia’s foreign policy conduct under Sukarno’s leadership was characterized by a strong anti-colonialism sentiment, akin to Asian and African countries that mostly shared the same history, which were formerly colonized nations. Demonstrating such an attitude towards colonialism through the country’s diplomacy was perceived as an action that perfectly embodied the national ideology, which is Pancasila (Subandrio, 1963).

Sukarno somehow showed the image of Indonesia to the world by promoting Pancasila to the international world, which this paper has narrowed down into: (1) as the anti-colonialism actor, and (2) as the leader of Asian and African nations. For Reinhardt, the first sequence’s substance (anti-colonialism view) substantially contributed to Indonesia’s, especially Sukarno’s growing importance on the international stage as the leader of Asian and African nations (Reinhardt, 1971). This assured that Indonesia’s political behavior ideals and conduct policies are based on shared beliefs that there are certain countries that are akin to Indonesia.

In the analyzed speeches, some discursive means were apparently being used to ensure these speeches’ contribution to Sukarno’s efforts in fostering Asian-African solidarity (Yeremia, 2020). First, the words “Asia” and “Africa” were often placed side by side or as a union as in “Asia-Africa”. Second, Sukarno used the pronouns “we” and “us” referring to Asian-African nations in the international forums amidst the presence of other nations. Third, he acknowledged the unity of Asia-Africa based on the shared experiences of formerly colonized nations. The use of these three discursive means brings about the emergence of the binary narrative of “us versus them” (Yeremia, 2020). Furthermore, the shared experience of being formerly colonized nations is the key component of in-group identity shaping.

More on this, Sukarno did not stop only “battling” colonialism. He further said in his speech in front of the United Nations: “I believe that there is a way out for these conflicting ideologies. I believe that the way out is by implementing Pancasila universally!”. He even said that the UN Charter is outdated and said that the five principles of Pancasila are worthy to be put on the Charter, which he believes would strengthen the organization. He also suggested moving the UN headquarters to be moved from New York to somewhere in Asia or Africa, where at that time, these places were far from the cold war conflicts between the East Bloc and West Bloc, in terms of geography. He further campaigned about the Non-Aligned Movement that neither sided with the USSR nor US. But chose to stand in the middle, to keep the peace within the world.

The ground of these acts by Sukarno is mostly based on his personal “believes”. He believed that there is a need to battle colonialism, as it grew from his shared ideas that have been constructed, which was colonialism is against the principle of peace, and obviously against Pancasila too. Furthermore, he also emphasized this shared idea that United Nations did not give a viable solution for conflicting ideologies during the cold war, and again, he emphasized the shared idea that Asian and African countries are akin to each other and could lead the world in a more peaceful situation. Lastly, stating the implementation of Pancasila universally could lead the world into a peaceful situation, reaffirming that the vision and conduct policies, also political behavior ideals of Indonesia are all based on Pancasila, which they believe would be
the viable solution for conflicting parties.

Following the Orde Lama (Old Order) Sukarno’s era, Indonesia entered a new phase, which is the Orde Baru (New Order). In this New Order, so many things changed from the previous era, and notably with the authoritarian government led by Suharto. Pancasila as the dominant discourse, reached its peak intensity in the New Order, as the government required all social organizations and political organizations or political parties to solely use Pancasila as their basis. Pancasila in the New Order was deliberately designed to be an ideology that is state-centered, applied purposely to make the people obey and submit to the government (Rachman, Abdullah, & Surjo, 2012). The state did various ways to do the “conquest” and applied a so-called state apparatus. However, apart from Pancasila being used as a political instrument of the New Order, but in this era, the discourse of Pancasila truly dominated the atmosphere of the society. But in this phase, Pancasila discourse experienced a tide.

During the New Order, scholars argued that the implementation of Pancasila has a very detrimental impact on the society. These impacts include the existence of corruption, weak law enforcement, democracy was not assured and lost, and a strong disparity between the regions and the central area occurred (Jaya, 2012). As what has been mentioned above, however Pancasila still dominated the atmosphere of society. Suharto made the so-called Pancasila P-4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila) or Eka Prasetya Pancakarsa which was a guide on the practice of Pancasila for Indonesian people in the New Order. The Pancasila P-4 was implemented in several institutions, and even taught in schools. However, due to the distinction between what is written and what is truly actualized by the people and the government, people were starting to get upset and even hate Pancasila because the government used it as an “instrument” without truly implementing the ideas (Morfit, 1981). It further reassured that different interpretations of Pancasila created different shared ideas within the people and the government itself. Of course, the identity created from the contextualization of Pancasila in the New Order, also implies their national interests and political behavior ideals.

Hereinafter, came a new era which is the Reformation era, after the fall of the New Order. Again, it brought another interpretation and contextualization of Pancasila. But this time, started by Gus Dur, it starts to revitalize the idea of Pancasila which was brought by their predecessors, and back to the original interpretation of Pancasila. First and foremost, Gus Dur realized that there was an identity crisis in Indonesia. He argued that the identity of Indonesia was built upon pluralism, which is aligned with Sukarno’s vision, but he said that it is fading because of the interpretation and contextualization made by the New Order (Susanto, 2016). In that case, the identity and policy choices made by Gus Dur are identical with the conduct of pluralism within the state, to assure the value of Pancasila that has been envisioned by the predecessors came back to the ground.

Up until right now, Indonesia is still in the Reformation era. The most recent interpretation of Pancasila is still aligned with Gus Dur’s interpretation, which is the recontextualization of Pancasila. This of course also affects how Indonesia acts regarding foreign policies. In 2010, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s president back then, stated that Indonesia’s foreign policy was “a million friends zero
enemy” (Falahi, 2013). This policy is meant to be a substitute for Indonesian foreign policy which has been used since the reign of Soekarno, which is the “free active” policy. Or this paper would say, this policy is meant to revitalize, with the recontextualization of Pancasila to reflect to its foreign policy. The “million friends zero enemy” policy is said as an extension of the previous foreign policy that Indonesia has adopted, i.e., “free active”. In the national role variables in the international system, the policy of “million friends zero enemy” only strengthens Indonesia’s position as a non-aligned country that does not want to take sides and befriend anyone. This further indicates that the changes do not bring a significant impact, but also indicates that there is a recontextualization within Indonesia’s foreign policy through the changing policies (Utari & Wardhani, 2021).

In this contemporary, the challenge that Indonesia is facing is that the demographic of Indonesia is vulnerable to the transnational ideology radicalization (Fitriani, Satria, Sari, & Adriana, 2018). Indonesia as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, supposedly play a much more important role in this transnational ideology, the Ummah or the Islamic world. The role that Indonesia could play is whether to be the most-vocal voice (knowing how important Islam is to Indonesia), or the other way around: the disengagement from the world’s Islamic affairs (Pitsuwan, 2012). Indonesia seems to rather stand with Pancasila, which can comprehend both positions in foreign affairs. Along with the “million friends zero enemy” policy, it allows Indonesia to befriend Islamic states while at the same time sticking to their domestic Pancasila identity. Again, the recontextualization of Pancasila which is being actualized in its foreign policy, acts to show Indonesia’s state identity that also shapes its state interests and behaviors.

In the domestic sector, the recent act for the recontextualization of Pancasila is the creation of Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila or BPIP (Development Body of Pancasila Ideology), which also hope would oppress external challenges. BPIP has a role to help the President to formulate policy directions for the development of the Pancasila ideology, coordination, synchronization, and controlling the development of the Pancasila ideology in a comprehensive and sustainable manner (Fatmala, 2019). Thus, it aims to create an identity within Pancasila again, and blatantly said that it will conduct the policy choices and political behaviors of Indonesia.

C. Conclusion

The political behavior ideals and state interests of Indonesia are embodied through Pancasila. Pancasila has been a huge determinant factor to portray the image of Indonesia as it creates the identity within the interpretation. The political behavior ideals (state interests) of Indonesia change over time, as the interpretation and contextualization made by the government, and what is conceived by the people determine the behavior and identity of Indonesia. Each era offers a different interpretation of Pancasila, despite there being a strong link made by the Reformation era, to refer back to the original concept of Pancasila.

Pancasila’s success became the shared idea and shared imagination, to be the foundation of Indonesian nationhood. Furthermore, Pancasila has always been the foundation of how Indonesia would act, because simply Pancasila emphasized Indonesia’s identity, which later formed Indonesia’s interests. The recent act by the government to recontextualize Pancasila into its origin through the help of BPIP is seen as a flaring move for Indonesia. The
authors suggested further research might be needed in the future regarding this topic.

**REFERENCES**


